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IN THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM
The proscription of simultaneous representation of potentially conflicting
interests in the present Code of Professional Responsibility runs counter to the
belief of many prospective clients that they are capable of formulating their own
objectives. The author examines three possible simultaneous representation
situations-the "friendly" divorce, the formation of a close corporation, and
the simple transfer of residential property. Finding that all three may present
appropriate cases for treatment by a single lawyer, the author suggests modify-
ing the presently restrictive Canon 5 of the Code of Professional Responsibility to
enable attorneys to better serve their clients 'needs within the limits of acceptable
ethical conduct.
I. INTRODUCTION
THE PRACTICING LAWYER NEED NOT be referred to Shake-speare' or Dickens2 to be reminded of the historic discomfort experi-
enced by the general public toward his profession. For those who come
in contact with lawyers only upon extraordinary occasions such as the
sale of residential real estate or to confer over a possible divorce, vocal
objections to both the complex legal requirements necessary to achieve
"simple" results and the significant legal fees connected therewith are
quite common. Such sentiment has a detrimental effect upon the
strength of any instinct to consult counsel in such situations.
A common example of the confusion and discontent of potential
clients arises when amiable parties to a proposed event of legal import
come to the attorney's office with what they believe to be a complete
agreement embodying their compromises and desires for their prospec-
tive relationship. They approach the lawyer with the notion that he
may guide them through the labyrinth of legal formalities required to
effect their arrangement and perhaps offer advice as to various legal
planning advantages along the way.
The lawyer, however, wishes to be quite cautious about becoming
involved in the representation of differing interests generally precluded
under Canon 5 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.3 Discipli-
1. Shakespeare, The Merchant of Venice.
2. C. DICKENS, BLEAK HOUSE (Illustrated Library ed.).
3. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DR 5-105(A) [hereinafter cited as
ABA CODE].
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nary rules4 DR 5-105(A) and (B) generally forbid the acceptance or
continuance of any employment situation in which "the exercise of the
lawyer's independent professional judgment will or is likely to be
adversely affected . . . -5 Language added in 1974 to both DR
5-105(A) and (B) also prohibits such employment "if it would be
likely to involve the lawyer in representing differing interests
",6
But there may be circumstances which fall within the exceptions to
the broad rule. Both of the above-mentioned subsections of Canon 5
note that to the extent that a given factual situation may fall within the
provisions of DR 5-105(C), the general prohibition shall not apply. 7
This crucial exception for the lawyer contemplating a multiple repre-
sentation relationship provides that:
In the situations covered by DR 5-105(A) and (B), a lawyer
may represent multiple clients if it is obvious that he can
adequately represent the interest of each and if each consents
to the representation after full disclosure of the possible ef-
fect of such representation on the exercise of his independent
professional judgment on behalf of each.'
Guided by his training in conservative, careful judgment, the
lawyer will be understandably concerned about proceeding with multi-
ple clients due to the somewhat unpredictable nature of how his
evaluation of the situation may be viewed in hindsight by a judge, an
ethics grievance committee, or a jury in a malpractice action. Also, he
may question the capacity of his clients to fully perceive and acquiesce
in the effects that potential conflicts may later have upon his independ-
ent judgment. The practical choice confronting the lawyer may be even
more difficult to deal with when one or more of the parties are previous
or regular clients or personal friends who have an aversion to involving
outside counsel.
In the event that the lawyer concludes not to undertake the repre-
sentation of multiple interests, his recommendation of separate, inde-
pendent counsel to one or more of a group of would-be clients may be
received with incredulity. From the clients' perspective, the lawyer's
refusal is unfathomable: his excessive cautiousness will mean ineffi-
ciency, added legal expense, and the possibility of an undesired adver-
4. The Disciplinary Rules are mandatory in nature. Id. Preliminary Statement.
5. Id. DR 5-105(A) (dealing with accepting such employment), DR 5-105(B) (con-
cerning the continuation of employment under these circumstances).
6. Id. " 'Differing interests' include every interest that will adversely affect either
the judgement or the loyalty of a lawyer to a client, whether it be a conflicting,
inconsistent, diverse, or other interest." Id. Definitions.
7. Id. DR 5-105(A), (B).
8. Id. DR 5-105(C) (emphasis added).
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sary atmosphere to their pre-agreed plan. Upon their insistence, even if
the lawyer should remain firmly committed to his original statement,
he may in many circumstances agree to conduct the necessary legal
tasks by representing only one of the parties. But, particularly if the
attorney enjoys the trust and confidence of all involved, the distinction
may indeed be merely nominal in practice. Despite his stress upon the
necessity of separate counsel, all parties may still be relying upon the
lawyer to advise them of what is "fair," and may well assume that he
is still "looking out for their interests," attributing his previous dis-
claimers and recommendation of separate counsel to overconscientious
legal caution.
I In light of increased efficiency, economy, and harmony, should
lawyers feel less strictly constrained from representing clients who
have apparently ironed out their differences in a mature and competent
manner? Is the common practice of nominal representation of only one
party's interests an acceptable compromise which meets client de-
mands and satisfies at least the technical requirements of the Code of
Professional Responsibility? The goal of this Note is to stimulate
thought concerning these questions, and to suggest possible modifica-
tions of the current ethical standards related to simultaneous represen-
tation of amicable clients.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The English origins of the prohibition upon representation of con-
flicting interests may be traced to the City of London Ordinance of
1280. 9 The rule was adopted into English common law by an early
decision of the Court of Queen's Bench: "No man, though by consent
of parties, can be attorney on both sides."' 0 Exceptions to the general
rule became readily apparent, however, during the development of the
British Commonwealth. An example which remains to the present day
is the ability of solicitors, since 1866, to represent both vendor and
purchaser in real estate transactions in parts of the Commonwealth."l
The idea of informal dispute resolution by means of a quasi-
judicial mediator is not new to American jurisprudence. Experiments
using both laymen and lawyers to cope with differences between
parties willing to forego formal judicial processes may be noted in the
development of the nation's judicial system. During the late seven-
teenth century, colonial community growth made supervision of the
9. H. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS 15 & n.41, 103 & n.20 (1953).
10. Anonymous, 87 Eng. Rep. 1085 (Q.B. 1702).
11. This exception has been the subject of modern challenge and often severe
criticism. 79 L.Q. REV. 25 (1963). See also text accompanying notes 119-25 infra.
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system of intrafamily self-government impractical. As a result,
"tithingmen"-individuals closely associated with a number of assign-
ed families-were appointed to the task of "inspecting and re-enforc-
ing family government" within each town in areas such as Colonial
Massachusetts. 12 Appropriate matters for the involvement of, and the
ultimate binding resolution by, a tithingman included not only drunk-
enness and "Sabbath-breakers," but the gamut of family disputes,
including divorce and property distribution.' 3
Though this mechanism clearly provided a quasi-judicial, binding
arbiter of family problems, it did indicate an early willingness to allow
personal, intrafamily difficulties to be resolved without resort to a
proceeding completely outside the family milieu. The process was
thereby private, informal, and avoided the battleground atmosphere
surrounding many modern uncontested divorce negotiations.
The American Civil War left in its aftermath not only the interrup-
tion of court functions throughout the South, but also the continued
practice of not admitting black testimony, especially in matters against
whites. 4 The Freedmen's Bureau, established in the South as a federal
agency to deal with a multitude of problems concerning the welfare of
the newly emancipated population (and eventually of all needy south-
ern residents) attempted to provide southern blacks with a fair tribunal.
The relatively small number of Freedmen's Bureau agents dealt infor-
mally with a wide range of interracial matters as well as with disputes
between blacks themselves and were frequently called upon to arbitrate
between spouses.' 5 The Freedmen's Bureau courts were overworked,
underexperienced, and highly informal, 16 "the typical kind of Bureau
court [being] a single-judge, no-jury court, backed by military power,
and having jurisdiction over all minor cases between Negroes or
between Negroes and whites, but not having authority to try more
serious offenses.' 17 Here again, the bureau official functioned as a
third party arbiter rather than an employee of two parties who share a
desire for a given legal result as in the modern simultaneous represen-
tation situations. Nevertheless, the operations of the Freedmen's
Bureau do indicate a recognition of the value of a more informal
approach to intrafamily dispute resolution, at least in extraordinary
circumstances.
12. E. MORGAN, THE PURITAN FAMILY: RELIGION & DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN SEVEN-
TEENTH-CENTURY NEW ENGLAND 148-49 (1966).
13. Id.
14. G. BENTLEY, A HISTORY OF THE FREEDMEN'S BUREAU 65 (1955).
15. Id. at 137, 160.
16. Id. at 160-61.
17. Id. at 153.
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Louis D. Brandeis, maverick lawyer and eventually Associate
Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, became involved in
several cases in which parties who consulted him ultimately had
interests which differed. 18 In one instance, he agreed to represent both
the trustees of a trust and the lessees of trust property with their consent
and after full disclosure of potential conflicting interests. In a second
case, he conducted an initial session with both concerned creditors and
an insolvent; he suggested a course of legal action, and then he
ultimately represented the creditors.' 9 Although his actions in the latter
case have been recently criticized because he did not satisfactorily
explain to the insolvent that he would be unable to represent him if a
conflict arose with a creditor,2° Brandeis' conduct was clearly of the
highest ethical intent. These past arrangements did not prove an insur-
mountable obstacle in his appointment to the Supreme Court bench.2'
But his self-characterization of his role in these matters as that of
" 'counsel for the situation' " was, as one author has put it, "one of
the most unfortunate phrases he ever casually uttered." 22
Brandeis was apparently committed to the belief that the practi-
calities of certain client counselling situations might best be dealt with
by one attorney handling all legal details involving parties with poten-
tially conflicting interests, given their informed consent. He believed
that a single, scrupulous attorney could best assure fairness to all
parties in the resolution of such matters. The hazards of being judged
later upon actions pursuant to those beliefs were experienced by him
firsthand, and the same risk threatens attorneys today under the Code
18. Frank, The Legal Ethics of Louis D. Brandeis, 17 STAN. L. REv. 683,702 (1965).
19. Id. at 694-703. The first case, referred to as the "Warren Matter," involved a
trust made up of properties from an estate which the Brandeis firm represented-the
firm also represented the beneficiaries. The properties were leased to a company com-
prised mainly of two trustees, one a beneficiary, and Brandeis represented them in their
capacity as lessees as well, with consent of all parties. Later, another beneficiary
objected to the management of these properties. In the second incident, known as the
"Lennox Case," Brandeis agreed to have his firm act as trustee of property of an
insolvent in an assignment for the benefit of creditors, with prior disclosure and consent.
Brandeis was later challenged when the parties disagreed as to the necessity of disclos-
ing all hidden assets of the insolvent, and as to what constituted minimal, reasonable
payments to the insolvent for management of the assigned assets, on the theory that the
Brandeis firm was not adequately representing the interests of the insolvent as a client.
This was asserted despite the early insistence by Brandeis to the insolvent and creditors
that he was not counsel for the insolvent, but rather represented the interest in preserv-
ing the assigned properties for payment of creditors. Id. at 694-703.
20. Id. at 702.





of Professional Responsibility. 23 The problems involved have led one
observer to warn:
If I may share a purely personal lesson, the greatest caution to
be gained from study of the Brandeis record is, never be
"counsel for a situation." A lawyer is constantly confronted
with conflicts which he is frequently urged to somehow try to
work out. I have never attempted this without wishing I had
not, and I have given up attempting it. Particularly when old
clients are at odds, counsel may feel the most extreme pres-
sure to solve their problems for them. It is a time-consuming,
costly, unsuccessful mistake, which usually results in disaf-
fecting both sides.24
Yet Brandeis' commitment to the efficacy of multiple representa-
tion in such circumstances is an indication of its potential utility in
dealing efficiently and economically with particular clients' needs.
Such needs might be better served given a slightly altered perspective
of the proper role of the adversary process in informal dispute resolu-
tion and a practical formulation of guidelines to identify suitable cases.
Ill. THE CURRENT CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
The Code of Professional Responsibility, adopted in 1969, at-
tempts to deal in detail with the question of when an attorney may
properly represent clients with actual or potential differing interests
and provide some bases for the practitioner's determination of whether
or not to proceed. 25 Against the general prohibition of such relation-
ships imposed by DR 5-105(A) and (B) is the exclusionary language
of DR 5-105(C), which would permit the lawyer to represent clients
with differing interests "if it is obvious that he can adequately repre-
sent the interest of each and if each consents to the representation after
full disclosure of the possible effect of such representation on the
exercise of his independent professional judgment on behalf of
each." 26
Even before the adoption of the new Code, one member of the
American Bar Association actively involved in the re-evaluation pro-
23. ABA CODE, supra note 3, at DR 5-105(C).
24. Frank, supra note 18, at 708.
25. Under the previous ABA Canons of Professional Ethics, the lawyer was re-
quired to disclose all relationships which he had with parties regarding any matter and
any possible connection with the situation that might have bearing upon the client's
choice of counsel. The Canon resembled the current ABA Code provisions in requiring
full disclosure and consent before permitting the representation of conflicting interests,
which were defined as existing whenever it was the lawyer's "duty to contend for that
which duty to another client requires him to oppose." ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL
ETHiCS No. 6.
26. ABA CODE, supra note 3, at DR 5-105(C) (emphasis added).
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cess noted that although some degree of flexibility was desirable, DR
5-105(C) situations would be rare. 27 Applying the guidelines of DR
5-105(C) to a given situation poses difficult problems for the prac-
titioner. First, he must consider whether he finds it "obvious" that he
may be able to adequately represent each party without an adverse
effect on his judgment or a dilution of his loyalty. 28 He must also be
concerned with the possibility that those who may review his choice
later will come to a different conclusion, at least in part due to the
benefit of hindsight. Further, careful thought must be addressed to the
ability of the particular clients to fully appreciate the potential conflicts
as they are explained by the attorney, given their prior experience with
and understanding of the law. A subjective failure on their part would
certainly be contrary to the spirit of the Canon, though apparently the
consent would still be effective against possible malpractice charges if
the disclosure by the attorney was objectively sufficient.29
In recognizing the existence of DR 5-105 situations, the lawyer
should be aware that differing interests may include those "conflict-
ing, inconsistent, diverse, or otherwise discordant." 30 The accom-
panying ethical considerations 31 may indicate that appropriate cases
exist only if disruption of client interest is not likely should conflicts
require the attorney's later withdrawal.32
The drafters clearly viewed the process of considering the desira-
bility of simultaneous representation as individualized:
Whether a lawyer can fairly and adequately protect the inter-
ests of multiple clients. . . depends upon an analysis of each
case. In certain circumstances, there may exist little chance
of the judgment of the lawyer being adversely affected by the
slight possibility that the interests will become actually differ-
ing; in other circumstances, the chance of adverse effect
upon his judgment is not unlikely. 33
27. Weddington, A Fresh Approach to Preserving Independent Judgment-Canon 6
of the Proposed Code of Professional Responsibility, Il ARiZ. L. REv. 31, 35-36, 53
(1969). The ABA Code suggests, however, that appropriate situations do exist. See ABA
CODE, supra note 3, at EC 5-15, 5-17.
28. ABA CODE, supra note 3, at EC 5-14. The suggestion by one author involved in
drafting the Code, that DR 5-105(C) allows the attorney to proceed even when the
employment "will or is likely to adversely affect [his] judgment," seems questionable.
Weddington, supra note 27, at 53.
29. Cf. Plante, An Analysis of "Informed Consent," 36 FORDHAM L. REV. 639,
650-57 (1968) (medical and surgical procedures).
30. ABA CODE, supra note 3, at EC 5-14.
31. The ethical considerations are "aspirational." Id. Preliminary Statement.
32. Id. EC 5-15. Should the lawyer's employment include the role of impartial
arbitrator or mediator between the clients, as opposed to attorney for each, he may be
precluded later from acting for any of the parties should his efforts at the former stage
prove unsuccessful. Id. EC 5-20; see note 116 infra and accompanying text.
33. Id. EC 5-17.
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Even should the lawyer conclude that he can adequately represent the
clients without sacrifice of independent judgment or client loyalty, the
clients' ultimate agreement with this belief is, of course, crucial. 4
IV. POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES OF ERROR IN
ELECTING TO REPRESENT MULTIPLE CLIENTS
Although consented to by all clients involved, the consequences of
an erroneous decision by a lawyer to represent interests in a manner
inconsistent with DR 5-105(A), (B), and (C) may affect all concerned
in a variety of ways. Should one or more of the lawyer's clients later
feel that a sacrifice of loyalty or independent judgment on the part of
his attorney resulted from the simultaneous representation arrange-
ment, a malpractice suit against the attorney is a very real possibility.
The lawyer will be held to a standard of ordinary care under the
circumstances. Prior consent by all parties will not bar recovery if the
attorney failed to meet his obligation to use reasonable care to maintain
his neutrality vis A vis each of his clients.35 Even threats of spurious
malpractice litigation, regardless of merit, would be unwelcome, of
course. Again, the lawyer must consider that his judgment will be
viewed by judge or jury with the benefit of hindsight in determining
whether his actions fell below the norm into the realm of negligence.
Naturally, although the Code of Professional Responsibility is
intended to provide guidelines for ethical conduct in every aspect of
legal practice, the Code serves its most direct function with respect to
disciplinary action. Barring the institution of a meritorious negligence
suit against him, the threat of discipline may be the greatest personal
concern of the practitioner involved. Even the tardy withdrawal of the
lawyer from an improper situation may serve both to demonstrate good
faith on his part and also to mitigate any formal sanction.3 6 Similarly,
inexperience may mitigate penalties, though it will not excuse the new
attorney for his unethical conduct.37
Improper activity by the lawyer in attempting to act for all parties
may also manifest itself in undesirable legal results for some or all of
the clients. Where an agreement was negotiated and concluded be-
tween the parties, such as a land transfer from seller to purchaser, one
34. Id. DR 5-105(C), EC 5-19.
35. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 161 (4th ed. 1971). See generally
Annot., 28 A.L.R.3d 389 (1969); Note, ProfessionalResponsibility and In Re Ryder: Can
an Attorney Serve Two Masters?, 54 VA. L. REV. 145 (1968). The plaintiff must show an
actual attorney-client relationship, real adverse interests, and actual (not merely nomi-
nal) damages. Contributory negligence may be a defense. Annot., 28 A.L.R.3d 389,
393-94 (1968).
36. In re Farr, - Ind. -, 340 N.E.2d 777, 788 (1976).
37. Annot., 17 A.L.R.3d 835, 842 (1968).
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of the parties may later be able to obtain rescission. 38 This may occur
even in instances where both parties agreed to rely on the attorney's
judgment at the time of the transaction, and where the lawyer's
intentions are entirely honest.39 In instances where formal judicial
resolution has taken place, as with the granting of a divorce after full
trial procedure, the potential exists for later collateral attack upon the
divorce decree.4n Failure to object to representation of conflicting
interests at trial in a timely manner, however, may be viewed as a
waiver. 41 Also, the possibility is ever present upon the voluntary or
mandated withdrawal of the lawyer that the parties may have to start
from scratch with new and separate counsel.
As in other instances where an attorney fails to fulfill his employ-
ment obligation to represent his clients with independent judgment and
loyalty, a lawyer may lose his right to compensation for services
actually rendered should he improperly represent differing interests. 42
Though in light of the potential for malpractice litigation and discipli-
nary action one would imagine that the loss of contractual rights to fees
would be of relatively minor import, it is a pocketbook consideration
which may have a substantial effect upon a lawyer's decision in DR
5-105(C) analyses.43
V. POTENTIALLY APPROPRIATE AREAS FOR
SIMULTANEOUS REPRESENTATION
There are many proposed events of legal significance which may
lend themselves to a "situation" approach by one lawyer; a number of
them have been discussed elsewhere. 44 The scope of this Note is
38. E.g., Holley v. Jackson, 39 Del. Ch. 32, 40, 158 A.2d 803, 808 (1959).
39. E.g., Wachsmut v. Miller, 168 N.W. 344 (Iowa 1918).
40. Note, Possible Effect of Conflict of Interests in a Divorce Action Arising From
Only One Attorney Obtaining the Decree, 15 ALA. L. REV. 502, 504-05 (1963).
41. Annot., 31 A.L.R.3d 715, 727-28 (1970).
42. Note, Trusts: Consequences of Attorney's Good Faith Representation of Adverse
Parties in Trust Administration-Potter v. Moran, 55 CALIF. L. REV. 948, 953 (1967).
See Florida Bar v. Teitelman, 261 So.2d 140, 143-44 (Fla. 1972).
43. The possibility also exists that should the clients' interests sufficiently conflict
so as to require withdrawal from the simultaneous employment situation, the lawyer may
(to his regret) be precluded thereafter from representing either party to the dispute. See
note 116 infra and accompanying text.
44. See generally H. DRINKER, supra note 9, 103-22 (1953); Weddington, supra note
27, at 52. For an examination of individual applications of the "situation" approach, see
also Hyman, Joint Representation of Multiple Defendants in a Criminal Trial: The
Court's Headache, 5 HOFSTRA L. REV. 315 (1977) (criminal defense); Katz, Negotiation
and the Lawyer-Client Interview, 5 U. TOL. L. REV. 282 (1974) (negotiation); Polow, The
Lawyer in the Adoption Process, 6 FAMILY L.Q. 72 (1972) (adoption); Symposium,
Conflicts of Interest Problems in Insurance Practice, 37 INS. COUNSEL J. 497 (1970)
(insurance); Note, Legal Ethics-If an Insurance Company Uses an Attorney Employed
to Defend the Insured as an Investigator to Prepare a Policy Coverage Defense, It Is
[Vol. 28:86
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limited to three areas which are each sufficiently different to test the
desirability of simultaneous representation in modern American prac-
tice: (a) uncontested divorce actions, where both spouses feel that they
can agree to a satisfactory settlement of their respective rights and
possessions with the help of a single attorney to assist them in planning
matters and the formalities of filing; (b) the formation of close corpora-
tions where all parties are amiable and employ a single attorney
because they wish to minimize their legal expenses and to avoid giving
the negotiations an adversary flavor; and (c) the typical, "straight
forward" sale of real estate, particularly residential property. By an
examination of the "situation" approach to providing legal services in
these three settings, one can test the plausibility of using this method
more frequently as a means of meeting client demands for greater
efficiency, economy, and a less adversary atmosphere in appropriate
circumstances.
A. Dual Representation in Uncontested Divorce Actions
Traditionally, the pursuit of a divorce decree has been viewed as
fraught with hostilities, requiring full utilization of separate, aggres-
sive counsel. Abuses of the attorney-client relationship in the divorce
setting demonstrate the dangers of entering multiple client employment
with less than complete objectivity.45 Many jurisdictions view divorce
as so entwined in adversary necessity that representing both spouses is
prohibited completely.46 This is true even after legislative adoption of
"no-fault" dissolution. 47
Estopped From Asserting The Defense, 52 Tnx. L. REV. 610 (1974) (insurance); Com-
ment, Conflict of Interests: Multiple Defendants Represented by a Single Court-Appoint-
ed Counsel, 74 DICK. L. REV. 241 (1970) (criminal defense); Case Comment, Professional
Responsibility-Will Drafting-Provisions Naming the Draftsman as Executor or Direct-
ing His Retention as Attorneyforthe Estate, 38 Mo. L. REV. 321 (1973) (estate planning);
Case Comment, Legal Ethics-Drafter of a. Will Who Serves as Executor, 75 W. VA. L.
REV. 190 (1972) (estate planning).
45. In re Carlton, 33 Mont. 431, 84 P. 788 (1906); In re Gilchrist, 208 App. Div. 497,
203 N.Y.S. 720 (1924); N.Y. County Law. A. Comm. on Professional Ethics Opinion
No. 265 (1928) [hereinafter cited as N.Y. County], reprinted in OPINIONS OF THE COMMIT-
TEES ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS OF THE ASSOCIATION OF THE BARS OF THE CITY OF NEW
YORK AND THE NEW YORK COUNTY LAWYERS' ASSOCIATION 678 (1956) [hereinafter cited
as N.Y. OPINIONS]; Mich. St. B.A. Comm. on Professional Ethics Opinion No. 85 (1945),
reprinted in 38 MICH. ST. B.J. 112 (1959).
46. Ishmael v. Millington, 241 Cal. App. 2d 520,527-28 n.4, 50 Cal. Rptr. 592,597 n.
4 (Dist. Ct. App. 1966); H. DRINKER, supra note 9, at 120; W. Va. St. B.A. Comm. On
Professional Ethics Opinion No. 89 (1963), summarized in 0. MARU, DIGESTS OF BAR
ASSOCIATION ETHICS OPINIONS 517 (1970); Fla. B. Comm. on Professional Ethics Opinion
No. 60-9 (1960), summarized in 0. MARU, 1970 SUPPLEMENT TO THE DIGEST OF BAR
ASSOCIATION ETHICS OPINIONS 165-66 (1972) [hereinafter cited as MARU SUPP.].
47. OSBA Ethics Committee Issues Opinion On Dissolution of Marriage-Formal
Opinion No. 30, 48 OHIO ST. B. REP. 780 (1975).
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The American Bar Association wished to encourage attempts by a
lawyer to reconcile a non-represented spouse with the lawyer's client.
Early recommendations included a warning, however, against even the
appearance of proffering advice to the "adverse" party, which might
lead the spouse to feel that his interests were being represented in any
degree whatsoever:
The proper procedure for the lawyer representing a party
seeking a divorce, and having occasion to communicate with
the adverse party not represented by counsel, would be to
limit the communication as nearly as possible to a statement
of the proposed action, and a recommendation that the ad-
verse party should consult independent counsel.
But the disapproval herein expressed should not be under-
stood as condemning the laudable and proper efforts which an
attorney may make to bring about a reconciliation between
his client and an adverse spouse not represented by counsel,
when such efforts involve no discussion of the facts which
furnish, or might furnish, grounds for divorce.48
The sentiment expressed by that early opinion is reiterated in the
present Code of Professional Responsibility. 49
A substantial question exists as to whether the lawyer representing
a client seeking a divorce decree is actually representing only one of
the spouses in a pure sense. Recent studies indicate that substantial
numbers of defendants to such actions never utilize the services of
separate counsel in uncontested divorce proceedings.5 ° Discussions
with a variety of practitioners lead one to the conclusion that although
on the surface lawyers represent only one party to dissolution actions,
their involvement may extend further. After impressing upon the non-
client spouse the importance of obtaining separate counsel, it is appar-
ently common for the attorney to allow the spouse to remain in the
room and to participate in the discussion with the other spouse, so long
as he understands that he is not represented.5'
48. ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, OPINIONS, No. 58 (1931). For an exam-
ple of the more bizarre extremes in which dual representation may or may not be
appropriate, see N.Y. County Opinion No. 99 (1916), reprinted in N.Y. OPINIONS, supra
note 45, at 567 (lawyer properly engaged in dual representation in bigamy context);
Comm. on Professional Ethics of the Ass'n of the Bar of the City of N.Y. Opinions 193
(1931), 689 (1945) [hereinafter cited as N.Y.C.], reprinted in N.Y. OPINIONS, supra note
45, at 94, 406.
49. ABA CODE, supra note 3, at DR 7-104(A)(2).
50. Project, The Unauthorized Practice of Law and Pro Se Divorce: An Empirical
Analysis, 86 YALE L.J. 104, 149 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Yale Project].
51. Cf. Seminar, Business Planning and Professional Responsibility: Problem 1, 8




Though the lawyer has made a sincere effort to encourage the
employment of another lawyer, the practical effect of this dialogue
may be quite different, particularly where the non-represented spouse
has had previous contact with the attorney, and may have some degree
of trust and confidence in him. The spouse may be greatly concerned
with the prospect of expending additional money on legal fees beyond
that necessary to pay the lawyer the couple has consulted together. He
may also legitimately feel that separate counsel is unnecessary, either
because of a failure to fully comprehend the differing interests
involved, or because of a sophisticated approach to the dissolution
process and a belief that the spouses can peaceably work out the terms
of the agreement. In either instance, the spouse may well attribute the
recommendations of the lawyer, however fervent, to overcautiousness
on the part of attorneys, or he may believe that lawyers are devoted to
generating unnecessary business for their colleagues. As a result, any
recommendations made by the attorney concerning the negotiations
and agreement may well be accepted by the unrepresented spouse
without further reflection, especially when prior dealings have instilled
a general feeling that the attorney is "fair."
The pressures exerted upon the lawyer by the spouses to represent
both of their interests and to help them give legal effect to whatever
agreement they may have reached between themselves may be even
greater when the lawyer has become personally acquainted with the
couple. Here, the reluctance may be strongest toward involving
outside counsel. Dissolution of a marriage relationship is a delicate and
private matter, and, where the parties feel that they can resolve the
problems concerning the dissolution of the union, they may react
violently to the notion of exposing their situation to anyone other than
their trusted friend. Though it has been suggested that it would be
desirable for the lawyer to decline the representation of either party
when a close personal relationship exists, 52 what is commendable in an
ideal setting may be difficult for an attorney to achieve when faced
with the persistence of friends.
Whatever the relationship between the attorney and the spousal
clients, a more open approach to providing even minimal services to
both parties is preferable to the current trend of effectively giving a
legal opinion to both while nominally representing but one client.
52. N.Y.C. Opinion 583 (1941), reprinted in N.Y. OPINIONS, supra note 45, at 329.
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1. Traditional Policies Against Dual Representation
in Divorce Actions
Two primary rationales have consistently been asserted to support
the proposition that representation of both divorcing spouses is ethical-
ly improper: the interest of the state in preserving the marriage process
as something more than a mechanical filing easily erased by mutual
consent, and the fear that such representation is a detriment to each
client as the lawyer learns of the financial condition of both spouses.
The state's interests in divorce proceedings are commonly viewed
as those of preventing casual entrance to and exit from marital relation-
ships, promoting the stability of a family setting where children are
involved, and sustaining a public image of the law as substantive rather
than a labyrinth of mere mechanical formalities. 53 The settlement of
property rights, dower interests, and the amount of alimony may also
be viewed as state concerns.54 Tenacious adherence to these principles
is demonstrated by a relevant ethics opinion:
Hence a dissolution of the marital relationship requires more
than the mere acquiescence or consent of the husband and
wife. This right of the state must be recognized and safe-
guarded in every divorce proceeding, and it is not sufficient to
obtain an absent party's consent to the preparation and filing
of an answer on his behalf, because the public interest is
paramount. It would make a mockery of divorce procedure if
a lawyer could act for both husband and wife and ignore the
public interest. Public consent to such procedure has not been
given and it most certainly could never be presumed. 55
The strength of these rationales for state concern in the preservation of
marriage relationships came under attack as early as the mid-nineteen
fifties, 56 and appears to have weakened with the widespread adoption
of various forms of "no-fault" dissolution statutes. 57
53. In re Themelis, 117 Vt. 19, 24, 83 A.2d 507, 510 (1951); cf. La. St. B.A. Comm.
On Professional Ethics Opinion No. 261, reprinted in 13 LA. B.J. 156 (1965) (alluding to
considerations beyond disclosure of client confidences without expressly mentioning
public interest).
54. Mich. St. B.A. Comm. on Professional Ethics Opinion No. 85, supra note 45.
55. Id.
56. Drinker, Problems of Professional Ethics in Matrimonial Litigation, 66 HARV. L.
REV. 443, 453 0953).
57. See text accompanying notes 67-79 infra. The dissolution process has recently
been characterized as primarily "elementary formalities, ancillary functions irregularly
exercised, and episodic mediation problems that can be exacerbated by legal representa-
tion." The study argues strongly that additional efforts by counsel to provide "emotional
support and personal counselling" are often wholly inadequate and such client problems




A concern may also be raised that simultaneous representation in
the divorce setting violates Canon 9 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which proscribes engaging in conduct which may ap-
pear improper to the public; 58 but this line of reasoning seems highly
questionable in view of persistent client demands for such services and
often appears to be a mere makeweight in place of more substantial
analysis. An additional factor often raised by laymen as a cause of the
prohibition is an assumed incestuousness on the part of the bar to
generate the maximum amount of legal business possible. Though the
existence of such public sentiment may be a consideration in any
proposed change of the current restrictions, it has no apparent substan-
tive validity as a justification for the present ethical position of the
profession.
The danger that dual representation may result in the revelation of
each spouse's confidential financial status to his partner is often stated
as a concern. 59 One bar ethics committee in a state with "fault"
divorce even felt that dual representation was undesirable because
disclosure of "the general relations between the parties, their acquaint-
ances, methods of life, etc. . . ." to the same attorney might harm
one or both of the parties in the divorce proceedings. 6° Realistically, of
course, the amount of harm from disclosure of such confidences seems
slight given the full consent of both parties to the subsequent dual
representation. A belief that the risks are great implies a presumption
that the spouses will wish to be less than candid in their negotiations
(rather than desiring an amiable and mature parting of the ways), and
also assumes that the husband and wife have concealed financial and
other data during their marriage. Though both presumptions may be
warranted in some circumstances, one would imagine them as com-
paratively rare, and tenuous support for a general prohibition against
consensual dual representation.
58. See generally A. KAUFMAN, PROBLEMS IN PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 38
(1976). For a specific and proper application of Canon 9's sanction, see General Motors
Corp. v. City of New York, 501 F.2d 639.(2d Cir. 1974).
59. See, e.g., Ariz. St. B.A. Comm. on Professional Ethics Opinion No. 295 (1969),
reprinted in 6 ARIz. B.J. 47 (1970); Ore. St. B.A. Comm. on Professional Ethics Opinion
No. 68 (1958), reprinted in OREGON STATE BAR, STATE BAR ACT; BY-LAWS; RULES OF
PROCEDURE RELATIVE TO DISBARMENT, DISCIPLINE AND REINSTATEMENT; RULES OF PRO-
FESSIONAL CONDUCT; CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETHICS; OPINIONS OF COMMITTEE ON LEGAL
ETHICS, Supplement 35 (1960); N.Y.C. Opinions 427 (1937), 380 (1936), reprinted in
N.Y. OPINIONS, supra note 45, at 202,227. But see Ariz. St. B.A. Comm. on Profession-
al Ethics Opinion No. 70-9, reprinted in 6 ARIZ. B.J. 49 (1970).
60. N.Y.C. Opinion 427 (1937), supra note 59.
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2. Unique Characteristics of Dissolution of Marriage Situations
The mention of divorce typically conjures up visions of emotional
and psychological devastation, and indeed such a decision is exhaust-
ing to the spirit. Providing legal counsel to spouses who have become
firmly and vociferously entrenched on opposite sides has been referred
to as "playing with dynamite." 61 At the other extreme is the spouse
who is so preoccupied with the notion of finally being freed from the
marriage bond that he is oblivious to settlement terms and will make
any concession, however regrettable later. 62
Clearly, neither of these situations lend themselves to dual repre-
sentation treatment. In the former case, the lawyer would be at a loss to
function in an advisory capacity between the hostile parties, and it is
even doubtful whether he could serve any useful purpose as an impar-
tial mediator between them within the contemplation of the Code. 63 In
the latter instance, separate counsel seems mandatory to assure that the
agreement reached while one or both parties are intent solely upon the
immediate dissolution does not result in bitterness or undue hardship
once the numbness of emotional shell shock passes.
These two extremes on the emotional spectrum in divorce situa-
tions should not be permitted to blur recognition of a very substantial
middle ground. Certainly, the bitterness, guilt, and other psychologi-
cal effects of dissolution must be acknowledged and dealt with by both
the compassionate legal practitioner and other professionals whose
services may be necessary. 64 Still, the possibility cannot be ignored
that many couples may be able to calmly and rationally negotiate the
terms of a mutually agreeable settlement without requiring the services
of separate, independent counsel. In uncontested divorce actions it is
evident that "[r]arely is the divorce itself at question. The real deci-
sions concern custody and finances, and overwhelmingly these issues
are decided in law offices." 65 The states and their respective bar
associations have a legitimate concern that parties may be inclined to
negotiate terms privately with which they may later be displeased
when the intensity of emotion dissipates and the economic and other
ramifications of the agreement begin to take effect. But a blanket
61. W. FISHER, WHAT EVERY LAWYER KNOWS 44 (1974).
62. Johnson, A Special Code of Professional Responsibility in Domestic Relations
Statutes?, 9 FAM. L.Q. 595, 599-600 (1975).
63. ABA CODE, supra note 3, at EC 5-20.
64. See Yale Project, supra note 51, at 152-53; see also Lindsley, The Family Court:
A Rational, Reasonable, and Constructive Revolution in Domestic Relations Law, 5
CALIF. W.L. REV. 7, 7-8 (1968).
65. Johnson, supra note 62, at 598.
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assumption that spouses are never able fully and competently to arrive
at a shared solution to marital dissolution by themselves at the kitchen
table in an amiable and equitable fashion is both paternalistic and
unfounded. To assert such a proposition would create the impression
that the legal profession presumes that spouses unfamiliar with the
rigors of the adversary process are incapable of determining their own
best interest, an attitude which approaches functional guardianship.
This attitude on the part of the legal profession has led to one sugges-
tion that lawyers be dispensed with completely in uncontested dissolu-
tion petitions, permitting the parties to proceed pro se without the
benefit of any legal planning advice except what may be available
through printed matter and from non-legal advisors. 66
The notion that a couple may be capable of deciding the terms of
their dissolution agreement by themselves at the kitchen table is but-
tressed by the trend toward "no-fault" divorce legislation. The past
decade has seen rapid reform of state divorce laws. With the exception
of Illinois, Pennsylvania and South Dakota, all states have now adopt-
ed one or another form of "no-fault" dissolution of marriage legisla-
tion.67 The philosophy behind this trend has been attributed to:
agreement [which] seems to be universal on the qualitative
aspects of marital dissolution-that the negative repercus-
sions of divorce are directly related to the existence of the
adversary process . . . . Recognition of this adverse effect
and the need for a remedy has been a prime motivating force
behind the move to no-fault legislation. It is reasoned that by
removing the fault-based grounds for divorce, or at least
providing a no-fault alternative to present grounds, the bitter-
ness and resulting problems that surround the dissolution of a
marriage can be mitigated. 68
Though one may question the validity of attributing the negative
aspects of marriage dissolution completely to the adversary process, it
seems clear that such statutes are based upon the conviction that the
spouses may effect a settlement without the stimulus of litigation. 69
The indication is that when the level of hostility is relatively low, the
parties may well be competent to negotiate their agreement without
lengthy court mediation. This being so, it would follow that the need
66. Yale Project, supra note 50, at 165.
67. Id. at 105 n.I. Pennsylvania is currently considering such legislation. 3 FAM. L.
REP. (BNA) 2182 (1977).
68. Johnson, supra note 62, at 596.
69. See OSBA Ethics Committee Issues Opinion On Dissolution of Marriage-
Formal Opinion No. 30, 48 OHIO ST. B. REP. 780, 781 (1975). Indeed, such practice is
common in uncontested divorce cases. Yale Project, supra note 50, at 138.
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for supervision of the negotiation by separate attorneys should also be
dispensable if the parties so elected.
This contention seems totally unacceptable to state ethics commit-
tees, however, even in the aftermath of "no-fault" legislation. Shortly
after the incorporation of such provisions in the Ohio Revised Code,70
the Ohio State Bar Association Ethics Committee expressed its explicit
disapproval of dual representation under DR 5-105(C) in dissolution
cases:
Spouses who seek a dissolution of marriage will not necessar-
ily be antagonistic to one another, but, they will have differ-
ing interests with respect to all matters which must be cov-
ered by the Separation Agreement. Furthermore, even though
those matters are not to be litigated in the usual adversary
way at the time of the hearing on the petition, (although either
may then express dissatisfaction) they may well be the sub-
ject of adversary litigation after the marriage contract is dis-
solved.7
The emotionally-charged atmosphere surrounding the divorce situ-
ation was cited as making impossible any prediction of when it may be
"obvious" that differing interests may be adequately represented by
one lawyer:
[T]he existence of fear and intimidation most often would be
masked and not readily ascertainable. Revelation of the real
problem and reasons prompting the action would not likely be
made to the lawyer nor would a spouse readily repose in him
confidences or secrets. Therefore, the professional obligation
of the lawyer to obtain full knowledge of his client's cause
could not be adequately performed. In effect, the lawyer
representing both spouses would be materially shackled in
any effort to obtain the information essential to a truly profes-
sional performance.
• . . In a marriage dissolution situation pragmatics make it
impossible for. . .[the lawyer] to make a proper judgment as
to the degree of variances in differing interests. 72
The Ethics Committee did indicate its approval of the lawyer's drafting
of the ultimate separation agreement, however, under the conditions
that:
(1) the second party is made fully aware that the lawyer does
not represent him or her; (2) that the second party is given full
opportunity to evaluate his or her need for representation free
70. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3105.01(K) (Page Supp. 1976) (effective since 1974). See
generally Norris, Divorce Reform, Ohio Style, 47 OHIo B.A. REP. 1031 (1974).
71. OSBA Ethics Committee Issues Opinion On Dissolution of Marriage-Formal
Opinion No. 30, 48 OHIO ST. B. REP. 780 (1975).
72. Id. at 783.
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of any potential conflict and to obtain his or her own counsel;
and (3) each spouse consents, in writing contained in or at-
tached to the Separation Agreement, to the lawyer so pro-
ceeding.73
The lawyer may not appear as counsel of record for both sides,
however. 74 This compromise is permitted in order to accommodate the
statute's purpose of allowing minimization of the adversary aspects in
divorce and to limit the legal fees to those of one attorney. Yet it has
the, effect of returning to the practice of nominally representing one
party, while the effects may be quite different upon the mind of the
unrepresented spouse. When both parties feel sufficient trust and
confidence in the lawyer to retain him as the sole drafter of what
ultimately will be their document, it is difficult to contend that any
amount of disclaimer by the attorney will eliminate a feeling that he is
drafting a document which will be "fair" to both spouses. 75 Of course,
any actual proffering of advice to the unrepresented spouse would
violate DR 7-104(A)(2). 6
An attorney contemplating dual representation, even after modera-
tion of the traditional disdain for such practice, would need to examine
carefully the present ability of each spouse to exercise the emotional
maturity and independence necessary to conduct settlement negotia-
tions.77 Should the lawyer be convinced that such capacity exists, yet
another potential problem must be addressed. To proceed with the
simultaneous representation of both parties in a hypothetical juris-
diction where such practice is permissible, it would still be necessary
to fully explain the potential adverse effects of such multiple represen-
tation upon the lawyer's judgment, and to obtain the spouses' consent
to the employment. Where the clients are relatively experienced or
sophisticated in legal matters, the task of effectively communicating
the conflicts involved may be a simple one. On the other hand,
detailing possible legal ramifications to a client with little or no
73. Id. at 783-84.
74. Florida takes a similar approach. Fla. B. Comm. on Professional Ethics Opinion
No. 66-8 (1966), summarized in MARU SUPP., supra note 46, at 186.
75. The final copy of the separation agreement will be presented to a referee for a
review. The judge's acceptance of the referee's decisions is normally perfunctory. See
Boyer, Parting Can Be a Bitter Sorrow: Judge Has Tough Role, Cleveland Plain Dealer,
March 20, 1977, § 4, at 1, col. 5.
76. See Yale Project, supra note 50, at 150. One wonders whether the practical
effect of allowing the unrepresented spouse to remain during the conferences about the
agreement, given a prior relationship of trust and confidence, is within the spirit of the
prohibition of DR 7-104(A)(2).
77. The degree to which one spouse may exert pressure and influence upon the
other, even at this late state of their relationship, must be considered. See text accom-
panying notes 61-62 supra.
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previous contact with legal affairs may be a tremendous task in which
even the orderly presentation of the pertinent information is difficult.78
Even with the advice of separate counsel, failure to fully comprehend
the terms of a divorce agreement is not at all uncommon. 79 Caution
should be exercised to be certain that the consent obtained from the
parties to such a dual representation is intelligent and fully informed.
When the clients are inexperienced-peculiarly handicapped in under-
standing the attorney's explanation of the potential conflicting interests
which may arise-the attorney should consider carefully whether,
even if he could structure his disclaimer to fall within the technical
requirements of DR 5-105(C), the "situation" approach is appropriate
for these parties within the spirit of that provision.
3. Policies Favoring Dual Representation
in Dissolution with Implementation Guidelines
a. The Economy of Using One Attorney. Particularly in middle
and lower income groups, the expense of legal advice and court fees
connected with a divorce can be a major concern. It is this factor which
motivates a large number of clients to use only one attorney, leaving
the other party unrepresented under the present ethical structure,
though he himself may feel that his interests are also being looked
after. 80
Though the Supreme Court of the United States has recently held
that the foreclosure of state divorce mechanisms for failure to meet
filing fee requirements is a violation of due process, 81 this principle has
not been extended to a right to counsel for indigent parties.82 The
advent of inexpensive "divorce kits" in some areas has proven to be of
little value to those who, due to educational limitations, lack of clerical
skills such as typing, and the unavailability of non-legal professional
78. On the other hand, inexperience in legal matters may not be inconsistent with the
ability of the spouses to equitably divide their possessions and comprehend the ways in
which they desire their marital relationship to be terminated, particularly when family
finances are not complex. An understanding of tax planning matters is not indispensable
to a decision as to the distribution of the family car, dog, personal momentos, and bank
account.
79. Johnson, supra note 62, at 599.
80. Id. at 605.
81. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
82. In re Smiley, 36 N.Y.2d 433, 330 N.E. 2d 53, 369 N.Y.S.2d 87 (1975); Menin v.
Menin, 79 Misc. 2d 285, 359 N.Y.S.2d 721 (Sup. Ct. 1974), aff'd mem., 48 App. Div.2d
904, 372 N.Y.S.2d 985 (1975); see Pagel, A Proposal for Reducing the Cost of Legal
Representation in Divorce Proceedings, 11 WILLAMETrE L.J. 344 (1975). See also Farrell
v. Farrell, 55 App. Div.2d 586, 390 N.Y.S.2d 87 (1976) (no constitutional right to counsel,
but bar has duty to provide representation for indigent defendant in divorce proceeding).
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help or guidance, cannot properly complete the necessary proce-
dures.83 In some jurisdictions, recent decisions have made the sale of
such kits impermissible.8
4
The ability of many parties to successfully use the divorce kit
alternative, however, may create an even stronger reluctance to incur
the expense of two attorneys for a procedure which the parties view as
primarily one of filing which can be accomplished without counsel. 85
The availability of one attorney to represent both spouses' interests
when drafting a dissolution agreement may be an ideal method of
regaining the confidence of the public in the utility of an attorney in
both the drafting and the planning aspects of a proposed divorce. It
would seem evident that such lawyer service would be preferable to the
widespread adoption of pro se divorce without the benefits of planning
advice.
b. Reduction of Artificial Hostilities. An oft-noted objection to
the current handling of divorce matters is the adversary atmosphere
surrounding the negotiation and settlement of even uncontested cases
where separate attorneys are involved. 86 The reduction of such ten-
sions is quite worthy of attention, though several commentators seem
to have gone to the extreme in attributing the entire hostile flavor of all
divorce actions to the present adversary structure,8 7 and even suggest
that it may be the lawyers' perception of their own role which adds this
flavor to the practice. 88 It seems quite appropriate, therefore, to allow
parties who have decided that dissolution will resolve their personal
dilemma to work out the terms of a separation agreement and petition
for divorce with one attorney. Where hostilities are already of such
proportion that simultaneous representation is not possible, the resul-
tant use of separate counsel need not exaggerate those emotions if the
counsel involved exercise proper reserve. 89
4. Application of a "Situation" Approach to
Uncontested Petitions for Dissolution of Marriage
Any attempt to change the present trend by state bar association
83. Yale Project, supra note 50, at 163-64.
84. Id. at 167-68.
85. Id. at 123-29.
86. See, e.g., OSBA Ethics Committee Issues Opinion On Dissolution of Marriage-
Formal Opinion No. 30, 48 OHIO ST. B. REP. 780, 783 (1975).
87. Note, The Role of the Lawyer in Divorce: Some Ethical Problems, 21 U. Prrr. L.
REv. 720 (1960); Johnson, supra note 62, at 596.
88. Johnson, supra note 62, at 599.
89. For a proposed code of practice to guide practitioners in the area, which has
already been adopted in New York State, see id. at 603-13.
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ethics committees to prohibit dual representation in divorce actions in
light of the above policy considerations would be difficult absent an
expression of support by the American Bar Association through a
modification in the Code of Professional Responsibility. Several alter-
ations of the present ethical considerations in Canon 5 might be
effective in this regard. First, the uncontested divorce between amiable
consenting clients might be specifically included in EC 5-17. 90 A
preferable option would be the inclusion of an additional ethical
consideration addressing the area specifically and directly:
Married persons who mutually desire the uncontested petition
for dissolution of their marriage may ask a lawyer to serve as
counsel of record for both husband and wife. In cases where
the potential hostilities between the parties seem obviously
minimal, and both appear to the lawyer to be capable of
dispassionately negotiating and selecting alternatives in the
preparation of the separation agreement, a lawyer may prop-
erly accept such employment. The lawyer shall only proceed
when he feels that his independent judgment will not be likely
to be affected, and only after giving a full disclosure of such
possible effects and having obtained the written consent of
the parties as a part of or attached to the separation agree-
ment. 91
The attorney considering engaging in this form of practice should
be fully aware of the possibility that if the amiability of the parties
sours, and he is required to withdraw from the dual representation, he
may very well be precluded from thereafter serving as counsel for
either spouse in the proceeding.92 The numerous ethical opinions
suggesting this result gain strong support from EC 5-20, which states
that:
90. EC 5-17 does not discourage representation by one lawyer of co-defendants in
criminal cases, or beneficiaries of an estate, or the insured and insurer in personal injury
cases, but suggests that whether a lawyer should represent both sides depends on the
circumstances surrounding each particular case.
91. For a recommendation that the written agreements as to form of lawyer employ-
ment be attached to the separation agreement, see OSBA Ethics Committee Issues
Opinion On Dissolution of Marriage-Formal Opinion No. 30, 48 OHIo ST. B. REP. 780
(1975). See also W. FISHER, supra note 61, at 43; Johnson, supra note 62, at 606; but cf.
In re Boone, 83 F. 944 (N.D. Cal. 1897) (agreement entered into by client, purporting to
release attorney from obligation not to represent others in matters related to attorney's
former representation of client, held invalid as too indefinite and obtained without
complete understanding by client).
92. N.J. St. B.A. Comm. on Professional Ethics Opinion No. 86, 88 N.J.L.J. 773
(1965); id. Opinion No. 26, 87 N.J.L.J. 19 (1964); 54 REPORT OF THE MD. ST. B.A. 117
(1949); N.Y. County Opinion 243 (1926), N.Y.C. Opinions No. 169 (1930), 163 (1930), 30
(1925), all reprinted in N.Y. OPINIONS, supra note 45, at 662, 81, 78, 14. But see N.J. St.
B.A. Comm. on Professional Ethics Opinion No. 89, 89 N.J.L.J. 56 (1966), id. Opinion
No. 131, 91 N.J.L.J. 369 (1968).
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After a lawyer has undertaken to act as an impartial arbitrator
or mediator, he should not thereafter represent in the dispute
any of the parties involved. 93
Though technically the lawyer in the proposed situation is not a
mediator or arbitrator, as he is presenting the legal ramifications of
dissolution and allowing the parties to mutually choose alternatives,
the spirit of this consideration clearly extends to the situation.
If the situation approach is adopted, additional secondary recom-
mendations should include the possibility of review by the referee and
judge in the ultimate court procedure to ascertain that the parties are
satisfied with the choices they have made in the final separation
agreement.94 Also, as lawyers begin dealing more frequently with dual
representation, further educational training in the related skills of
counselling may be appropriate to meet more effectively the demands
of the new role. 95
When spouses have considered the possibility of dissolving their
marriage, and have come to an attorney's office to discuss this option
with him, it is generally accepted that the lawyer's first action should
be to attempt a reconciliation between the parties. 96 On its face, this is
always a desirable measure which will help to affirm that the parties
are genuine in their decision and that neither spouse is using the visit to
the lawyer as a final attempt to communicate the seriousness of the
marital problems to the other spouse. It would seem, however, that
moderation in that effort is appropriate in some circumstances. Particu-
larly in the instance where the lawyer might contemplate representing
both spouses, an over-zealous attempt to reconcile a couple who come
to the lawyer having thoughtfully negotiated their dissolution could
cause alienation of the clients' confidence. 97 Exploring the potential
for reconciliation is an important first step, however, as later advice to
separate may further limit opportunities for the spouses to consider
reunion.98
93. ABA CODE, supra note 3, at EC 5-20.
94. Yale Project, supra note 50, at 138. Similar review is already the practice in
some jurisdictions. See, e.g., Boyer, supra note 75.
95. For a vivid description of the current failure of many lawyers to counsel
effectively, see Yale Project, supra note 50, at 152-53.
96. ABA COMMiTrEE ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, OPINIONS, No. 58 (1931).
97. One survey shows that ninety percent of uncontested divorce actions involve
couples whose minds were made up to end their marriage from the moment they began to
seek dissolution; the only questions to resolve were the terms of the separation agree-
ment. Johnson, supra note 62, at 598.
98. For a criticism of the adversary process as actually working against the interests
of the parties and impeding attempts at reconciliation, see Note, The Role of the Lawyer
in Divorce: Some Ethical Problems, 21 U. PITr. L. REv. 720 (1960).
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Although the lawyer may not be the professional with the most
expertise in personal and emotional counselling, often he may be
called upon to provide this service. The dual representation case would
presume a lower level of hostility between the clients, but the severe
psychological effects of their decision may still require professional
attention. Even when the lawyer feels capable of providing such
support, he may wish to seriously consider how it could appear to
the spouses to reflect upon his independent legal judgment and he may,
therefore, decide to refer the client(s) to a medical or social profes-
sional. 99
When these initial steps are concluded and the parties are still
intent upon petitioning for the divorce decree after a full disclosure of
conflicts, and after informed consent has been given by both parties,l°°
the lawyer's next consideration is what role he shall play in the
negotiations, settlement, and preparation of the petition. If the spouses
have a general idea of the result they wish to effect with their agree-
ment, but have not discussed in detail the terms concerning property
division, possible alimony, and the variety of rights concerning any
dependents involved in the marriage, the lawyer may serve as a
mediator between the parties eliciting their feelings and, ultimately,
their mutual decisions. This function is recognized as appropriate for
the lawyer by the Code of Professional Responsibility.101
The lawyer may be most useful as a planning advisor when the
couple has amicably arrived at the terms which they wish to include in
their agreement. 10 2 Impartiality is the necessary key to the lawyer's
presentation. Detailing the various legal planning advantages in the
area of income tax and elsewhere should be accompanied by careful
explanation of the available options and the effects of each decision.
The ultimate choice should then be made by the spouses jointly. The
direct recommendation of a conflicting mode of action to each spouse
in succession, on the other hand, would give the appearance of con-
flict, and would erode trust and confidence in the lawyer. Done
properly, a counselling session may be of enormous aide to spouses
who are trying to insure that the results they desire are expressed in the
final agreement. Though one study indicates that many attorneys fail to
99. One study suggests the possibility of pro se divorce as a means of eliminating
attorney's fees and reallocating available funds to suitable professional counsellors and
medical personnel. Yale Project, supra note 50, at 153.
100. See text accompanying notes 61-79 supra.
101. ABA CODE, supra note 3, at EC 5-20. But this may preclude the lawyer from
representing either party later. See also text accompanying note 92 supra.
102. Form filing may be accomplished by parties without counsel in some cases. Yale
Project, supra note 50, at 123-29.
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provide this important service in a comprehensive manner, and that
others succeed only to have the advice ignored by the parties,103 this
modicum of failure clearly should not lead to the conclusion drawn in
the Yale study that the attorney be eliminated in his role as a planning
counsellor.
Naturally, in engaging in dual representation, the attorney should
keep a careful record of both the disclosures of potential conflict which
were made to the clients, and their responses to his various planning
and drafting suggestions. To further document the consent of the
parties, he may wish to consider not only noting his representation on
the ultimate agreement, but also having the parties sign a consent form
indicating that the situation has been fully explained and understood.
Though such consent will not be deemed a release of the attorney's
duty of care in maintaining his independent professional judgment, 104
it may serve as prima facie evidence of compliance with the disclosure
requirements of DR 5-105(C) and the proposed accompanying ethical
consideration. 105
B. Multiple Representation of Clients Forming A Close Corporation
A hypothetical may best establish the most troublesome situation in
this area. A number of friends or acquaintances of the lawyer enter his
office to propose that he represent them in the formation of a new
business venture which they have planned. The lawyer cautions them
at great length concerning their potentially differing interests and the
advisability of separate counsel, fully aware that originally friendly
business ventures may quickly sour. Yet they persist in their desire to
retain him.
As one authority has noted, in a concise but comprehensive explo-
ration of this situation, the parties may at best attribute the warnings of
the attorney to a tendency toward conservative judgment and cau-
tiousness on his part, and at worst may become highly insulted at the
suggestion that their harmonious group might become divided.106 In
most instances they will continue to exert pressure upon their trusted
lawyer to accept the employment proposed.
There is some support for the propriety of accepting employment in
these matters under some circumstances. The drafting of contracts for
103. Id. at 138-39.
104. In re Boone, 83 F. at 955. At least one commentator has suggested that the
lawyer and the parties enter into an employment contract detailing their expectations and
responsibilities. See Johnson, supra note 62, at 606.
105. See text accompanying note 91 supra.
106. Smith, Close Corporations: a treatise-and an analysis, 43 CLEV. B.J. 243, 244
(1972).
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both parties where they so consent has been approved, 10 7 and it has
been proposed that corporate reorganizations and some business plan-
ning matters may also be appropriate for simultaneous representa-
tion. 108 Additionally, there may be "exceptional situations [in which]
the client's interests may be better served by the lawyer's representa-
tion than by his refusal, even though such employment subjects him to
the influence of differing interests." 1 The decision to hire one lawyer
to represent the interests of all parties could conceivably even be
viewed as one of the many business risks which may be acceptable to
the clients in determining the costs of operation. The disclosure re-
quirements which ethical guidelines place upon the attorney arguably
make the risk for the entrepreneurs no greater than those associated
with the real asset projects contemplated for the corporation, and
businessmen are accustomed to balancing such risks against costs
every day.
Counter to this is the suggestion by one prominent panel that the
attorney might best deal with the situation posed in the above hypothet-
ical by refusing to represent more than one of the parties, while at the
same time explaining that the other participants may stay during the
consultation, though they are not to be represented by him. "o As in the
divorce situation,"1 ' the practical effect of such an arrangement may be
that the parties continue to regard the lawyer as concerned for each of
their interests, especially when they have had a previous relationship
of trust and confidence with him, either professionally or personally.
In any case, it would appear inescapable that if they decide to remain
without independent counsel, the ultimate effect will be the adoption
by all parties of the lawyer's recommendations to his single client. To
insist upon the thin distinction that only one party is nominally repre-
sented as a client is to deny the reality of the situation, and the reliance
which all present place upon the lawyer's comments. Perhaps the
preferable solution, if the lawyer is unwilling to represent the interests
of all parties, is to refuse employment completely in anticipation of a
later rift among the prospective shareholders.1
2
107. N.Y. County Opinion 155 (1918), reprinted in N.Y. OPINIONS, supra note 45, at
605.
108. Weddington, A Fresh Approach to Preserving Independent Judgment-Canon 6
of the Proposed Code of Professional Responsibility, I 1 ARIZ. L. REv. 31, 52 (1969).
109. Id. at 35.
110. Seminar, Business Planning and Professional Responsibility: Problem 1, 8 Prac.
Law 17, 23 (1962).
111. See pp. 95-109 supra.
112. See W. FISHER, supra note 61, at 44.
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Should the attorney decide to proceed with the representation of all
parties, numerous problems must be overcome. First, he may find it
difficult to detail for the clients the potential differing interests which
may influence his independent judgment, a disclosure required by DR
5-105(C). Potential conflicts which may arise include tax planning,
the effect of death, retirement, or disagreement by a shareholder, co-
mingling of personal and corporate assets, or other breaches of statu-
tory formalities. The future rights of minority shareholders, the prob-
able lack of a viable market for closely held corporate shares should a
stockholder decide to shift his investment, early obsolescence of pat-
ents or inventions, and the addition of new contributions of the same
nature are also possible problems over which conflicts may arise." 3
The possible differences that may develop between the parties are so
complex, and so numerous, that the lawyer may feel unequal to the
virtual clairvoyance expected of him. Even if the lawyer feels that he
can adequately foresee how his judgment may be influenced in the
future, he may find it difficult in some situations to sufficiently explain
the impact of differing interests upon his prospective clients.
One of the most important factors making the formation of close
corporations appropriate for an "attorney for the situation" approach
is the frequent sophistication of the parties involved in business and
legal matters. They are much more capable of appreciating the possible
conflicts, and of weighing them during the drafting stage and through
subsequent dealings, than are the typical parties to a divorce proceed-
ing who may have had little or no prior contact with the legal process.
But the possibility that the clients may have experience in legal matters
cannot be asserted as a general presumption; the parties may come to
the lawyer with only minimal notions of what they wish to accomplish,
and seek not only the lawyer's legal advice but his business judgment
as well in formulating the direction of their proposed venture. 114 In the
latter instance, great caution should be exercised in explaining the
situation to the parties. The attorney should feel confident that they
perceive the differing interests which may arise, and are able to cope
with them in the course of sessions which the attorney may conduct.
Any doubts which the attorney has should be resolved against the
representation of multiple clients. " 5 Again, it should be kept in mind
that discussing in detail the proposed arrangement with all the parties
113. Smith, supra note 106, at 244.
114. Id.
115. ABA CODE, supra note 3, at EC 5-15.
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may lead the attorney to be barred from representation of any of the
clients under certain circumstances." 6
These considerations, combined with a conscientious effort on the
part of the lawyer to fully apprise the parties of the potential conflicts
and the effect they may have upon his judgment, may be a sufficient
guide to the attorney attempting to comply with DR 5-105 as it
presently exists. Indeed, the representation of multiple parties in the
drafting of documents concerning the formation of closely held corpo-
rations is not wholly uncommon today.'
Finally, the representation of multiple clients in the close corpora-
tion setting could be subject to a different standard of care than that
normally associated with the attorney-client relationship. Though one
commentator has suggested that the standard of care in multiple rep-
resentation cases be raised,I 8 this does not seem to be the real implica-
tion of a new rest. The role of the attorney must now be viewed not in
terms of strict adversary loyalty to the individual client, but rather in
terms of a strong duty to pursue the legal objective which the parties
wish to accomplish, and to present the various alternatives to the
clients in a neutral manner for their ultimate selection. Such a standard
would not necessarily be higher than that of ordinary care usually
associated with the attorney-client relationship, but rather would shift
its focus to a loyalty to the mutually established goals of the parties.
The practitioner, while being encouraged to engage in a "situation"
approach to legal counselling in appropriate cases, would be held to a
strict standard in his subsequent actions to verify that he can implement
the desires of the clients in an unbiased manner.
C. Representing Seller and Purchaser in Real Estate Transactions
One additional area in which the employment of a "situation"
approach to the dispensing of legal advice might be appropriate is in
the sale of real estate, particularly when residential real estate is sold
by a homeowner without the use of any intermediary. Here the concern
for minimal legal expense is again a strong factor, and it is also in this
situation that the parties may least understand the differing interests
which may arise. Their view of the transaction's import may not
116. See, e.g., N.Y. County Opinion No. 577 (1970) (issued in looseleaf form by the
New York County Lawyers' Association Committee on Professional Ethics); N.Y.
County Opinions 389 (1950), reprinted in N.Y. OPINIONS, supra note 45, at 776.
117. See Smith, supra note 106.
118. See Note, Trusts: Consequences of Attorney's Good Faith Representation of




extend beyond the paperwork involved and issues concerning title
examination." 9
The practice of allowing one attorney to handle a real estate sale
between buyer and seller has been accepted in parts of the British
Commonwealth since 1866.120 The approach has come under severe
criticism, 121 however, and does not appear to have originated with a
desire to reduce the costs of counsel in such instances.122 Arguing for
the abolition of the practice, one author comments that since the sale of
real estate is such an uncommon event for most people, the cost of
separate legal representation on such occasions is not burdensome. 123
Though this fact may make the potential client no less hesitant to
expend additional money upon legal counsel, the situation may be
distinguished to some degree from that of the divorce action in that
there is some revenue being generated for the seller, and thus he may
be somewhat less reluctant to invest in legal fees. The purchaser will
also want to protect his substantial investment. Oddly enough, al-
though it has been urged that the general British policy allowing
simultaneous representation in real estate closings should be aban-
doned, in instances where the parties are both previous clients of the
solicitor it has been suggested he should proceed to accept the employ-
ment. 24 It would seem that the interests of the attorney in placating his
existing clients is placed ahead of the general recognition by the author
that, particularly where the parties are previous clients, simultaneous
representation is improper due to the conflicts involved.
It does appear that the use of one attorney by both sides in the
British situation results in savings of approximately twenty five per-
cent in legal fees for each party to the transaction. 125 Arguably,
efficiency may also be increased due to the elimination of communica-
tions between attorneys, and the ability of one attorney to rely upon his
own past title searches when subsequent transfers of the same fee are
accomplished. 126
But, as a practical matter, there are drawbacks in the widespread
practice of dual representation. Some have expressed doubt as to
whether an attorney can apply the same scrutiny to his own document
119. See "Conflict of Interests" in Realty Transactions, 83 N.J.L.J. 76 (1960).
120. 79 L.Q. REV. 25, 27 (1963). See also Burbidge, Acting for Both Parties, 4 AUSTL.
LAW. 65 (1963); Reynolds, Acting for Both Parties, 37 L. INST. J. 307 (1963).
121. 79 L.Q. REv. 27-28 (1963).
122. Id.
123. Id. at 27.
124. Id.
125. Burbidge, supra note 120, at 66.
126. Id.
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as to those drafted by others, 127 and further problems may arise if, for
example, a defect in title were discovered by the attorney. It has been
argued that disclosure of the defect (which would seemingly be the
appropriate course of action) or failure to disclose would be a breach of
duty to one party or the other. 128 There may not actually be a breach of
duty or a hardship, however, if full disclosure has taken place be-
forehand. Both parties should understand that any difficulty or defect
discovered concerning the real estate or the transaction itself will
necessarily be raised for their mutual consideration. 129
In a recent ethical opinion encouraging the use of dual representa-
tion only in rare circumstances, the traditional view of possible differ-
ing interests was reiterated:
In real estate transactions it is not always true, even in rela-
tively simple ones, that representation of both buyer and
seller involves nothing but computations of adjustments and
preparation of the deed. A number of questions arise that
require the exercise of legal judgment. Examples are (i)
whether the deed should be full covenant and warranty, bar-
gain and sale, with or without covenants, or quitclaim, (ii)
what customs are to be followed in making adjustments, (iii)
which points disclosed in the title report are important and
which may be disregarded, (iv) what title company to use,
considering the fact that a title company reinsuring may per-
petuate past errors which another title company would pick
up. 130
The same ethics committee addressed the matter again four years later,
and though emphasizing its previous hesitations, this time the commit-
tee seemed more favorable toward the use of dual representation in
appropriate buyer/seller situations, given complete disclosure and con-
sent.
13 1
Numerous other jurisdictions have approved the use of one attor-
ney for both sides in real estate closings and related legal matters as a
general proposition, so long as requirements parallel to those of DR
5-105(C) are met, even where the attorney may give little advice and
in effect serve as a mere scrivener for the parties.' 32 Indeed, a number
127. Reynolds, supra note 120, at 311.
128. Id.
129. Cf. N.Y. County Opinion 90 (1916), reprinted in N.Y. OPINIONS, supra at 45, at
563 (duty to disclose defect to both parties even though nominally representing only one,
where lawyer enjoys their mutual trust and confidence).
130. N.Y. St. B.A. Comm. on Professional Ethics Opinion No. 38 (1966), reprinted in
39 N.Y. ST. B.J. 242 (1967).
131. N.Y. St. B.A. Comm. on Professional Ethics Opinion 162(1970), reprinted in 43
N.Y. ST. B.J. 286 (1971).
132. N.Y. County Opinion 615 (1973); Opinions of State Bar of Texas Comm. on
Interpretation of the Canons of Ethics, Opinion 228 (1959), reprinted in 18 BAYLOR L.
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of courts have stated that such situations do not even involve the
representation of conflicting interests at all, where the terms of sale
have been ironed out between the parties before they consult the law-
yer. 133 Similarly, an attorney's representation of both the purchaser
and the seller was held proper when a defect in the title was found
during preparations for closing. 134
It would appear that a distinction may be made between real estate
transactions and other types of multiple representation cases. Unlike
many other areas, the potential conflicting interests and effects upon an
attorney's independent judgment seem uniquely predictable:
The parties expect to give and receive a good title, upon
customary terms. If special questions arise, either of title or
terms, they can be discussed with both parties. The question
will be of a well-defined class. It may turn out that one party
or both will be disappointed if the lawyer raises issues that
burden one or the other with unexpected expenses or that
cause the deal to fall through; but there will be no feeling of
disappointment with the lawyer's role. He was expected to
raise such issues. Once raised, there were no practical alter-
natives to what had to be done about them; they had to be
dealt with on lines established by real estate law or custom.
REV. 309 (1966); N.J. St. B.A. Comm' on Professional Ethics Opinion No. 100, 89
N.J.L.J. 696 (1966), Opinion No. 51, 87 N.J.L.J. 705 (1964).
133. Kreis v. Block, 75 A.2d 523, 524 (Mun. Ct. App. D.C. 1950); Hatch v. Morgan,
12 So.2d 476 (La. 1942); cf. Blevin v. Mayfield, 189 Cal. App. 2d 649, 652, 11 Cal. Rptr.
882, 884 (1961) (lawyer who incorporated clients' desires into written document a mere
"scrivener") (citing Lessing v. Gibbons, 6 Cal. App. 2d 598, 45 P.2d 258 (1935) (repre-
senting both parties in contractual matters)). The Lessing court noted:
We are fully aware of the delicacy of the questions which can arise in cases
where an attorney attempts to represent two parties whose interests might
develop a conflict. But in the absence of litigation or contemplated litigation,
the general rule prohibiting the representation of clients with conflicting inter-
ests by a single attorney has never been so broadly stated as to preclude an
attorney from ever accepting employment from two different persons merely
because of a possibility of a conflict of interests. . . . Were this not the rule,
the common practice of attorneys in acting for both partners in drawing articles
of copartnership or drawing agreements for the dissolution of copartnership, in
acting for both the grantor and the grantee in the sale of real property, in acting
for both the seller and purchaser in the sale of personal property, in acting for
the lessor and the lessee in the leasing of property, and in acting for both the
lender and the borrower in handling a loan transaction would be prohibited even
though done in the utmost good faith and with the full consent of all parties
concerned. In each of these instances there is the possibility of conflict, if not
an actual conflict, in the interests of the persons represented, but it cannot be
said as a matter of law that an attorney is prohibited from acting for both parties
in such cases with the knowledge and consent of both.
Id. at 605-06, 45 P.2d at 261. Though the case supports the propriety of simultaneous
representation under some circumstances, the statement that even when actual conflicts
are present the attorney may proceed with the representation, given full disclosure and
consent, appears inconsistent with EC 5-15.
134. Okla. B. A. Legal Ethics Comm. Opinion No. 140 (1937), summarized in 0.
MARU, DIGESTS OF BAR ASSOCIATION ETHICS OPINIONS 411 (1970).
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Both clients understood this when they consented to be repre-
sented by the same lawyer. So the disappointed client does
not blame the lawyer, for he knows that he had consented to
have the lawyer do just what was done.'35
Should the lawyer elect to engage in such multiple employment
situations, he may be held to a high standard in ascertaining that his
clients fully understand and consent to the relationship they are en-
tering:
The court is well aware of the common practice of adverse
parties agreeing to use the same attorney, particularly in real
estate settlements. An attorney, so acting, has a heavy burden
to see that there is full disclosure and full protection of both
parties. 136
Among the numerous results of failure on the lawyer's part may be
rescission of the contract or deed by a dissatisfied party. 13 7 Yet, with
careful adherence to the guidelines of DR 5-105(C) and conscientious
action to protect the respective interests of all parties to the transaction,
it would seem that in the area of real estate fee transfers an attorney
will most easily be able to represent dual interests while meeting the
higher standard of care due to the certainty of the substantive law in
this area and the predictability of results.
VI. CONCLUSION
The above examination of three potential cases suggests there may
be a wide variety of situations in which parties feel that they may bring
their interests into harmony and etch them into legal obligations with-
out separate legal assistance in negotiations and drafting. Though the
need for such a mechanism is most imperative in the divorce con-
text, 138 it is in this area, due to the high degree of emotion and
psychological strain involved, that hesitation has been most persistent,
even in light of the recent trend toward the acceptance of a "no-fault"
option in dissolution statutes. Adding an ethical consideration to the
Code of Professional Responsibility would serve as a first step toward
responding to this client need, and would set uniform guidelines which
135. W. FISHER, supra note 61, at 42.
136. Holley v. Jackson, 39 Del. Ch. 32, 40, 158 A.2d 803, 808 (1959) (emphasis
added); see also Note, Trusts: Consequences of Attorney's Good Faith Representation of
Adverse Parties in Trust Administration-Potter v. Moran, 55 CALIF. L. REv. 948 (1967).
137. Holley v. Jackson, 39 Del. Ch. 32, 40, 158 A.2d 803, 808 (1959); Wachsmut v.
Miller, 168 N.W. 344 (Iowa 1918).
138. The outcry to provide a viable alternative to the expense and tension of an




could be adopted by the states to assist attorneys desirous of selecting
appropriate cases.
The close corporation setting seems the most difficult to deal with
due to the vast potential consequences which any imaginable conflict
might have upon the lawyer's independent judgment. But a "situa-
tion" approach has already gained considerable practical acceptance,
even if under the guise, in many instances, of nominal representation
of one client only. With careful planning and explicit advance disclos-
ure to all involved, such practice may be conducted consistent with the
Code of Professional Responsibility as it now exists. In analyzing costs
of separate counsel to guard against possible future differences, busi-
nessmen may even view the "situation" approach as a minimal and,
therefore, an acceptable business risk.
The real estate fee transaction in which the lawyer may represent
both the buyer and seller seems a clear case for a "situation" approach
due to the predictability of potential conflicts and the relatively stan-
dard procedures for dealing with such exigencies when they do arise.
A change in focus on the part of the attorney, from acting as counsel
for a single party in an adversary setting to working impartially to
achieve the clients' goals, would be the attorney's proper role in such
"situations."
One commentator has proposed a list of factors appropriate for
consideration by the attorney contemplating multiple client employ-
ment:
[T]he degree to which the interests differ, the probability that
the lawyer will be influenced by the differing interests, and
the extent to which his client's interests would be harmed if
the lawyer's judgment were affected.' 39 Factors favoring the
propriety of representation would include any unique value to
the client's interest in retaining the lawyer in question, such
as his familiarity with the details of a complex legal transac-
tion, or the desire of several parties that the lawyer in ques-
tion serve as mediator or arbiter of these interests. 40
Added to this should be the desire of the parties to avoid an adversary
setting to their relationship, and a concern to avoid added expense of
additional counsel.
Any decision whether and when to undertake the simultaneous
representation of potentially differing interests requires careful reflec-
tion and, to a substantial degree, an intuitive feeling of the extent to
139. This last consideration must not weigh heavily in the analysis; if influence on the
lawyer's judgment is likely, DR 5-105(C) requires refusal of the offer of employment.
140. Weddington, supra note 108, at 36.
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which the individual lawyer knows he can maintain his independent
judgment. With such qualities warehoused, he may well feel the
preparedness which was attributed to Brandeis by a recent commen-
tator. For when the actual client enters, project in hand, it is the
decisiveness which comes from personal conviction that must ulti-
mately be the key for any "attorney for the situation."
' 141
JAMEs C. HAGY
141. Frank, The Legal Ethics of Louis D. Brandeis, 17 STAN. L. REV. 683,709 (1965).
